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Aristotle on the Purity of Forms in Metaphysics Z.10-11 
[forthcoming in Ergo] 
 
Abstract: Aristotle analyses a large range of objects as composites of matter and form. But 
how exactly should we understand the relation between the matter and form of a composite? 
Some commentators have argued that forms themselves are somehow material, that is, forms 
are impure. Others have denied that claim and argued for the purity of forms. In this paper, I 
develop a new purist interpretation of Metaphysics Z.10-11, a text central to the debate, which 
I call 'hierarchical purism'. I argue that hierarchical purism can overcome the difficulties faced 
by previous versions of purism as well as by impurism. Roughly, on hierarchical purism, each 
composite can be considered and defined in two different ways: From the perspective of 
metaphysics, composites are considered only insofar as they have forms and defined purely 
formally. From the perspective of physics, composites are considered insofar as they have 
forms and matter and defined with reference to both. Moreover, while the metaphysical 
definition is a definition in the strict sense of 'definition', the physical definition is a definition 
in a loose sense. Analogous points hold for intelligible composites and geometry. Finally, 
neither sort of definitional practice implies that, for Aristotle, forms are impure. 
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In Metaphysics Z.11, Aristotle’s investigation into substance culminates in the claim that form 
is primary substance.1 On the way, Aristotle develops an account of the relation between 
matter and form which has generated a great deal of exegetical controversy. Some scholars 
take Aristotle to argue that forms involve matter, that is, that forms are impure. By contrast, 
other commentators hold that, for Aristotle, forms do not involve matter, that is, forms are 
pure. The importance of the question cannot be overstated. For if forms involve matter, matter 
is part of the essence of form, and hence the explanatory priority of form over matter, and the 
status of forms as primary substances, is threatened.2 
   As I see it, the exegetical debate over the purity of forms has reached something of an 
impasse. As far as Z.11 is concerned, there has been an unfortunate tendency to focus on a 
few passages, most notably the so-called 'Socrates the Younger Passage' (1036b21-32), with 
little attention paid to their larger argumentative context. In order to advance the debate, a 
more contextual reading is required which considers the overall architectonic of the chapter as 
well as the way in which it builds on the preceding Z.10. In the following, then, I will offer 
such a contextual reading, and I will defend the view that, in Metaphysics Z.10-11, Aristotle 
provides us with an elaborate argument for the purity of forms. 
   Roughly, on my interpretation of Z.10-11, which I will call hierarchical purism, each 
composite has two definitions, one in terms of its form alone, and one in terms of both its 
form and its matter. Which definition we should choose depends on how we consider the 
composite, either only insofar as it has a form or insofar as it has both a form and matter. 
Moreover, since, if we consider a composite only insofar as it has a form, it should be defined 
without reference to its matter, forms are pure. 
                                               
I am immensely grateful to Mary Louise Gill, David Charles, Jacob Rosen, and Justin Broackes for our many 
discussions of Metaphysics Z.10-11. I would also like to thank Jonathan Beere, Emily Katz, Jeremy Kirby, 
Hendrik Lorenz, Benjamin Morison, and audiences at the Princeton Classical Philosophy Work in Progress 
Seminar and the Pacific APA, Vancouver for their stimulating questions. Finally, I have greatly profited from 
the detailed comments by two anonymous referees and the area editor for Ergo. 
1 'For substance is the immanent form (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν) from which together with matter the composite 
substance is said' (1037a29-30). 
2 Compare Malink 2013: 245. 
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   I will begin by characterizing the 'impurist' view that forms involve matter and three 
versions of the opposing 'purist' position: Hard purism, soft purism, and my hierarchical 
purism (section one). Next, I will argue that the two extant versions of purism, hard and soft 
purism, are unsatisfactory as interpretations of Z.10-11. For neither view can account for 
Aristotle’s vexing tendency to insist both that composites should be defined with reference to 
their formal parts alone, and that they should be defined with reference to their material parts 
as well (sections two and three). Nonetheless, impurism does not fare better either (section 
four). Rather, I will argue that only hierarchical purism can deliver a coherent reading of 
Z.10-11, and I will explain why its implication that each composite has two definitions should 
not frighten us (section five). Finally, I will sum up my results and explain why, if 
hierarchical purism is true, Aristotle’s forms are pure (section six). 
   Of course, the overall question whether Aristotle’s forms are pure or impure does not 
depend solely on how we read Metaphysics Z.10-11. Here, I will defend the restricted thesis 
that, in Z.10-11, Aristotle argues for the purity of forms. Indeed, in order to keep a clear view 
of Z.10-11, I will avoid relying on external evidence directly concerning the purity of forms, 
especially from De anima.3 How the results reached in Z.10-11 relate to other texts is a 
question for another day. 
 
 
1. Purism and Impurism 
 
Before we delve into the text of Metaphysics Z.10-11, we need an outline of our exegetical 
options. Four options will be considered in this paper: Impurism, hard purism, soft purism, 
and hierarchical purism. While the former three interpretations have been defended by other 
                                               
3 In De anima, perhaps the most important passages are DA I.1, 403a3-b19, and the definition of soul in DA II.1, 
412a1-b9. For an impurist interpretation of DA I.1, see Charles 2008 and 2009, and for a purist response Caston 
2008. 
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scholars, hierarchical purism is the new view I will develop here, with the ultimate goal of 
vindicating the purity of forms.  
   Sometimes, the claim that forms involve matter or are impure is spelled out in terms of the 
definition or essence of the form. Michail Peramatzis, for example, says that the form is 
defined with reference to matter, or that matter is part of the essence of the form.4 However, 
in Z.10-11, Aristotle rarely speaks of the definition of the form, rather than of the composite, 
and when he does so, he has in mind the definition of the composite in terms of the form.5 
Impurism is better characterized by the conjunction of the following two schematic claims: 
 
 (1) The definition of a composite should mention only the form of the composite. 
 (2) The definition of a composite should mention the matter of the composite. 
 
Taken together, those claims suggest that, as the impurist has it, the form of a composite is 
itself 'material', in a sense yet to be specified. 
   The two extant purist options are characterized by their rejection of either (1) or (2). Hard 
purists, such as Michael Frede and Günther Patzig, accept (1) but reject (2). That is, they 
think that, at least in Metaphysics Zeta, the definition of a composite mentions only its form 
but never its matter.6 On the other hand, soft purists, such as W. D. Ross, Mary Louise Gill, 
and Robert Heinaman, accept (2) but reject (1). On their view, the definition of a composite 
                                               
4 He writes both that 'material parts are part of a form’s essence' and that material parts are 'referred to in [the] 
definiens [of the form]' (Peramatzis 2011, ch. 3: 39). 
5 For example, at the beginning of Z.11, Aristotle says that 'the definition is of the universal and the form' 
(1036a28-29). But that remark is made in service of the claim that one needs to distinguish the formal from the 
material parts of a composite since otherwise 'the account of the object (τοῦ πράγµατος) will not be clear either' 
(1036a30-31). In effect, then, what is at stake is the definition of the composite in terms of its form rather than 
simply the definition of the form. Similar points apply to two passages in Z.10 (1035a17-22; 1035b31-1036a2). 
6 Frede & Patzig 1988 II, e.g. 211-213; Frede 1990. See also Wedin 2000, ch. 8; Menn 2001: 107-115; Devereux 
2010. 
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should mention its matter, but they take that to imply that the definition mentions matter in 
addition to the form.7 
   As we will see, hierarchical purists should reject both (1) and (2), as they stand, and accept 
qualified versions of both. If a composite is considered only insofar as it has a form, it should 
be defined exclusively with reference to its form. But if the same composite is considered 
insofar as it has both a form and matter, it should be defined with reference to both its form 
and its matter. On hierarchical purism, then, each composite has two different definitions, and 
depending on how one considers the composite, one or the other definition should be chosen. 
Furthermore, the hierarchical purist takes those definitions to be hierarchically ordered: 
Strictly, only the purely formal definition of the composite is a definition at all because it 
states the essence of the composite. But in a looser sense of 'definition', the composite can be 
defined with reference to both its form and some of its material parts. 
   The force of the distinction between purism and impurism depends on how we specify 
'matter' in (2). No impurist wants to say that the particular bits of matter into which a 
(sensible) composite perishes are parts of its form.8 Terence Irwin and Jennifer Whiting, for 
example, insist that it is only the functional material parts of the composite, such as the hand 
of an organism, which are parts of its form.9 Peramatzis and David Charles, in turn, hold that 
none of the material parts of a composite are also parts of the form, neither the bits of matter 
into which the composite perishes nor its concrete functional material parts (nor even types of 
such concrete matter).10 Rather, some of the material features (or material "ways of being") of 
composites are parts of their forms.11 The purist, on the other hand, must take Aristotle to 
                                               
7 Ross 1924 II: 197; Gill 1989, ch. 4; Heinaman 1997. See also Bonitz 1848-49: 333; Morrison 1990; Ferejohn 
1994; Caston 2008. 
8 Impurists also hold that the intelligible matter of a geometrical object is part of its form, but they do not seem 
to differ in how they interpret that claim. We will return to geometrical objects in section 3. 
9 Whiting 1986: 372; 1991: 631; Irwin 1988, ch. 11: 245-247. 
10 Peramatzis 2011, ch. 1: 7, 10. 
11 Charles 2008: 10-15; 2009: 296-97; Peramatzis 2011, ch. 2: 41-42; ch. 4: 73; ch. 5: 98-99; Peramatzis 2015: 
209-210. – Peramatzis’s examples for the relevant material features or ways of being include 'being made of a 
bulky mass which is (e.g.) malleable, solidifiable, and wrought-able' (2011, ch. 1: 7), and 'having living and fully 
functional hands which can perform successfully their relevant function' (2011, ch. 5: 98). 
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claim that neither the material parts of a composite nor its material features are parts of the 
form.12 
   Since the four exegetical options are characterized by their acceptance or rejection of claims 
about definition, a brief note on definitional language is in order. In Z.10-11, Aristotle often 
speaks simply of a 'λόγος' or 'account' rather than of a 'ὁρισµός' or 'definition' even when he 
has in mind a definition. He alerts us to that feature of his exposition right at the beginning of 
Z.10 where he says that 'the definition (ὁρισµός) is an account (λόγος)' (1034b20) and then 
proceeds to raise a puzzle concerning definitions using the language of 'accounts' (1034b20-
24). Similarly, throughout Z.10-11, we should expect Aristotle to be interested in accounts of 
a special sort, namely, definitions, even though he does not bother to make that explicit at 
every turn of the argument. 
   On the other hand, Aristotle does not always use definitional language in the strictest sense. 
In the strictest sense, a definition is the account of the essence of a primary substance (Z.5, 
1031a11-14). But in Z.10, Aristotle is happy to speak of 'defining' organs like the finger or 
mathematical objects like the acute angle, none of which are primary substances (1035b7-11; 
1036b8-10). Hence, while Aristotle is interested in definitions throughout Z.10-11, those 
definitions may not all turn out to be definitions in the strictest sense. I will revisit that last 
point in section five. With those caveats in mind, let us finally tackle the text. 
 
 
2. The Purist in Trouble 
 
The central difficulty for any interpreter of Metaphysics Z.10-11 is the perceived incoherence 
of Aristotle’s view on the definition of matter-form composites. Sometimes, Aristotle asserts 
                                               
12 But the purist can allow that, in giving a definition of a composite solely in terms of its form, one will mention 
matter other than the matter of the composite. For instance, one can define a house purely formally as 'shelter for 
goods' where the goods are material, but not material parts or features of the house. 
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that only the formal parts of a composite should be mentioned in its definition.13 At other 
times, he urges that some of the material parts should be mentioned too.14 One of the 
problems with purism has been that its two extant versions, that is, hard purism and soft 
purism, can make sense of only one or the other strand of Z.10-11. Thus, impurists have felt 
invited to reject purism wholesale. Here, I will characterize the weaknesses of both hard 
purism and soft purism by analysing a passage in Z.10 which I will call the 'Puzzling Passage' 
(1035a17-25). In the next section, I will argue that the problems arising for both brands of 
purism from the Puzzling Passage are amplified in Z.11. 
   The guiding question of Z.10 is 'whether the account of the parts must be present in the 
account of the whole' (1034b22-24).15 Aristotle quickly arrives at a first answer: The parts of 
the composite should be mentioned in its account or definition if (and only if) they are among 
its formal parts. For example, the letters should be mentioned in the definition of the syllable 
because they are among its formal parts, but the segments should not be mentioned in the 
definition of the circle because they are among its material parts (1035a9-12).16 
   It is against that background that we should read the ensuing Puzzling Passage:17 
 
[A] For (γὰρ) the line, too, even if, when divided, it perishes into the halves, or the 
human being [even if, when divided, it perishes] into bones and sinews and flesh, are 
not for that reason also from those [parts] as from parts of their substance (ὡς ὄντων 
τῆς οὐσίας µερῶν), but as from matter, and they are parts of the composite (τοῦ 
                                               
13 E.g. 1035a9-12; 1035a17-22; 1035b31-36a2; 1036a26-b7; 1037a21-29. 
14 E.g. 1035a22-25; 1036b21-32. 
15 Cf. Menn (2001: 108-109) who stresses that the original question is whether the parts must be mentioned, not 
which parts, as is sometimes claimed. 
16 In Z.10-11, Aristotle treats the segments as intelligible material parts of the circle which are 'closer to the form' 
than perceptible material parts such as bronze in which the form of circle might be instantiated (1035a13-14). He 
is most explicit about taking the segments to be intelligible material parts in his discussion of semicircles in Z.11 
(1036b32-37a5). On the other hand, in Z.10, the letters of the syllable are treated as its formal parts, except for 
the perceptible letters of particular perceptible syllables (1035a14-17). By contrast, in Z.17, Aristotle seems to 
take the letters of any syllable to be its material parts (1041b30-33). 
17 All translations are mine. – The 'for' (γάρ') at 1035a17 introduces the reason why the material parts of a 
particular sensible syllable should not be mentioned in the account of the syllable. 
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συνόλου), yet not of the form and of that of which the account is; nor are they 
therefore in the accounts. [B] The account, then (µὲν οὖν), of such parts will be in [the 
accounts] of some things, but it must not be in [the accounts] of others if it is not of the 
composite (τοῦ συνειληµµένου); for that reason, some things are from the parts into 
which they perish as from principles (ὡς ἀρχῶν), but others are not. (1035a17-24) 
 
   In section [A], Aristotle follows the reasoning from before. Even though composites perish 
into their material parts, those material parts are not 'parts of their substance' or form 
(1035a20), and hence they should not be mentioned in their definitions. For example, a 
human being perishes into bones, sinews, and flesh, but those material parts are parts only of 
the composite, not of the form, and hence they should not be mentioned in the definition of 
the human being.18 Unfortunately, in [B], Aristotle appears to deny the claim made in [A]. 
The account of 'such parts', that is, seemingly, of the material parts into which a composite 
perishes, should be parts of the account or definition of the composite.19  
   Crucially, Aristotle uses different words for 'composite' in [A] and [B]. In [A], Aristotle 
calls the composite a 'σύνολον' or 'whole', while in [B], he calls it a 'συνειληµµένον' or 'thing 
taken together with [matter]'.20 The hierarchical purist interpretation of Z.10-11 will take its 
cue from that verbal distinction. But for now, it is worth noting a difference which the verbal 
distinction does not track: It does not track an extensional difference. For among the 'things 
                                               
18 Aristotle must have in mind particular composites. For only particular composites perish into their material 
parts. That raises the question how Aristotle can allow himself to speak of 'definitions' here (or, more generally, 
of 'accounts'), given that the objects to be defined are particulars. I will return to that question in section 5.iv). 
19 The transition from [A] to [B] is tricky. If one takes 'µὲν οὖν' inferentially, say, as a 'therefore', Aristotle infers 
from the discussion in [A] that the account of 'such parts' is in the account of some things but not of others. But 
that inference makes sense only if, as the hard purist has it, 'such parts' refers to the formal parts. Yet, the 
reference seems to be to the material parts. (We will return to that point shortly.) My suggestion is that we take 
'µὲν οὖν' not inferentially, but simply as continuing Aristotle’s train of thought. Thus, we do not have to assume 
that [B] draws an inference from [A]. Rather, [B] continues where [A] left off, albeit in a quite different vein. 
That also allows us to take 'such parts' to refer to the material parts. 
20 Aristotle gives two different explications of the latter expression, speaking of 'those things which are the form 
and the matter taken together' (1035a25-26) and what is 'taken together with matter' (1035a34-b1). 
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taken together with matter' is Kallias, that is, a human being, who perishes into flesh and 
bones (1035a33). In [A], then, we are told that the composite human being should not be 
defined with reference to the material parts into which it perishes, but in [B] we are told that it 
should be so defined; and similarly for other composites. 
   Neither hard purism nor soft purism can make good sense of the Puzzling Passage. Hard 
purists thrive on [A] which suggests that only the formal parts of a composite should be 
mentioned in its definition. But they are troubled by [B] where Aristotle seems to claim that 
the composite should be defined with reference to some of its material parts, too. On the other 
hand, soft purists are happy with [B] which is in line with their view that composites should 
be defined with reference to both their formal and material parts. But soft purists are 
dismayed by the claim in [A] that composites should be defined only with reference to their 
formal parts. 
  On behalf of hard purism, Michael Frede and Günther Patzig have responded that, at the 
beginning of [B], 'such parts' (1035a22), refers all the way back to parts like the letters of the 
syllable (1035a11), that is, to the formal, not the material parts of the composite.21 On their 
reading, then, Aristotle consistently argues that only the formal parts of a composite are to be 
mentioned in its definition. But as several scholars have pointed out, it is hardly credible that 
'such parts' refers back to the formal parts rather than the material parts discussed in the 
immediately preceding passage.22 
   Revising the Frede-Patzig response, Daniel Devereux has suggested that 'such parts' refers 
to the parts into which a composite is divided, including both its material and its formal parts. 
Moreover, on Devereux’s reading, it is only the formal parts which are mentioned in the 
definition of the composite.23 But if that were right, Aristotle’s claim that only some things 
                                               
21 Frede & Patzig 1988 II: 180. 
22 Morrison 1990: 136-137; Bostock 1994: 150; Heinaman 1997: 285-289. 
23 Devereux 2010: 172-173. 
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are from the parts into which they perish as from principles would be puzzling. For surely, all 
things are from their formal parts as from principles. Aristotle’s claim must be that only some 
things are from the material parts into which they perish as from principles. Hence, according 
to [B], the parts to be mentioned in the definition of the composite must be material parts. 
   On the other hand, soft purists have tried to restrict [A] to the definition of forms: The form 
of a composite should be defined without reference to the material parts into which the 
composite perishes. But, as we are told in [B], the composite itself should be defined with 
reference to those material parts.24 
   Yet, [A] concerns the definition of the composite, not merely of the form. For Aristotle is 
interested in the definition of things which perish into their material parts, which must be 
composites. He claims that those material parts are not parts of the substance of the 
composites, and hence they are not parts of the form, that is, 'of that of which the account is' 
(1035a21). But the force of that claim is not merely that the material parts are not parts of the 
form and should not be mentioned in the definition of the form, but also, and by the same 
token, that they are not parts of that in terms of which the composite is defined. Similarly, 
when Aristotle argued earlier that the segments should not be mentioned in the definition of 
the circle because they are among its material parts, he must have meant the composite circle. 
For the form of the circle does not have any non-formal parts which could count as its parts.25 
   In short, while hard purists cannot accommodate the suggestion in part [B] of the Puzzling 
Passage that the material parts of a composite should be mentioned in its definition, soft 
purists cannot account for [A] where Aristotle claims that composites should be defined with 
reference to their formal parts alone. Those difficulties for both extant varieties of purism are 
amplified in Z.11, as we will see next. 
 
                                               
24 Bonitz 1848-49: 333; Ross 1924 II: 197; Gill 1989, ch. 4: 127; Heinaman 1997: 291-292. 
25 Devereux develops that objection to soft purism at greater length (2010: 171-172). 
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3. Purist Troubles Amplified 
 
In the following, I first want to argue that the main body of Z.11 mirrors the argumentative 
structure of the Puzzling Passage in Z.10. Consequently, both hard purism and soft purism 
struggle to give a coherent reading of Z.11. What I call the 'main body' of Z.11 extends from 
the beginning of the chapter through the 'Mathematical Passage' or 'MP' (1036b7-20) and the 
'Socrates the Younger Passage' or 'SYP' (1036b21-32). Roughly, the introductory section of 
Z.11 (1036a26-b7) is in line with part [A] of the Puzzling Passage, while the MP and the SYP 
reflect part [B] of that passage. Second, I will argue that the relevant part of the summary of 
Z.4-11 (1037a21-33), too, displays that same dialectic. 
 
i) The Main Body of Z.11 (1036a26-b32) 
 
Z.11 starts out with a puzzle: 'One wonders reasonably both what sort [of parts] are parts of 
the form and what sort are not, but [parts] of the composite (τοῦ συνειληµµένου)' (1036a26-
27). While Z.10 was concerned with the question whether the parts of a whole should be 
mentioned in its definition, Z.11 aims at distinguishing the formal from the material parts of 
the composite. The way Aristotle sets up that task favours the hard purist. For Aristotle claims 
that 'the definition is of the universal and the form' (1036a28-29), apparently assuming that 
only the formal parts of a composite should be mentioned in its definition (1036a29-31). In 
the same vein, Aristotle goes on to claim that flesh and bones of a human being are not 'parts 
of the form and account' (1036b5), with the implication that only the parts of the form should 
be mentioned in the definition of the human being.26 
                                               
26 I take it that Aristotle affirms that flesh and bones are not parts of the human form even though he expresses 
that claim as part of a double question (pace Bostock 1994: 160; Peramatzis 2011, ch. 5: 93). For Aristotle often 
uses double questions to affirm what is asked in the second question, e.g. in Meta. Z.4, 1030a2-3; Meta. Θ.7, 
1049a1-3; Phys. IV.13, 222a29-30; DA II.12, 424b14-16; EN IX.13, 1165b14-15, 1165b17-18, 1165b23-24. 
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   Overall, then, the introductory section of Z.11 proceeds as predicted by the hard purist and, 
by the same token, spells trouble for the soft purist. But hard purism, too, begins to face 
problems when, in the ensuing Mathematical Passage, Aristotle objects to his opponents’ 
practice of defining geometrical objects:27 
 
Since that seems to be possible, but since it is not evident when, some are already 
puzzled also about the circle and the triangle that it is not appropriate for them to be 
defined (ὁρίζεσθαι) by lines and the continuous, but that all of those things, too, are 
said just as if they were flesh and bones of the human being, and bronze and stone of 
the circle28; and they lead back (ἀνάγουσι) all things to the numbers, and they say that 
the account of a line is that of two. (1036b7-13) 
 
   Hard purists take Aristotle still to be concerned with distinguishing the formal from the 
material parts of the composite.29 On their reading, Aristotle’s opponents claim that 
geometrical objects should be defined without reference to 'lines and the continuous' (1036b9-
10) because they mistake them for material parts.30 But according to Aristotle, as presented by 
hard purism, geometrical objects should be defined with reference to the continuous because 
the continuous is one of their formal parts.31 That last claim will lead to problems for hard 
purism if we look beyond the MP. 
   At the beginning of the SYP, Aristotle describes the mistake criticized in the MP thus: 
 
                                               
However, even for impurists, it should be uncontroversial that flesh and bones are not parts of the human form 
since, in Z.10-11, flesh and bones are treated as the parts into which a human being perishes (cf. 1035a17-19). 
27 The opponents are Platonists and/or Pythagoreans, but their exact identity is uncertain. See Ps.-Alexander 
512.23-24; Bonitz 1848-49: 339; Ross 1924 II: 202. 
28 With Frede & Patzig, I follow the manuscript tradition EJ here which has 'circle' rather than 'statue' (Frede & 
Patzig 1988 II: 207). 
29 Frede & Patzig 1988 II: 206; Devereux 2010: 177. 
30 I suggest that a line is simply the continuous in one dimension (cf. Meta. K.3, 1061a33-34), and I will drop 
reference to the 'lines' except where relevant. 
31 Frede & Patzig 1988 II: 201. 
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So, that the issues about definitions pose some problem (ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν), and for 
what reason, has been said. Hence it is needless trouble (περίεργον) to lead all things 
back (ἀνάγειν) in this way, and to take away the matter; for presumably some things 
are this in this or these being in this state (ὡδὶ ταδὶ ἔχοντα). (1036b21-24). 
 
   It seems that, in defining geometrical objects in terms of numbers, and without reference to 
the continuous, Aristotle’s opponents define geometrical objects with reference to their formal 
properties alone, 'taking away the matter' (1036b23) from the definition.32 If that impression is 
not deceptive, hard purism is in trouble. For hard purists claim that the continuous is a formal 
part of a geometrical object. But if Aristotle also takes the continuous to be the matter of 
geometrical objects, hard purists must admit that some of the material parts of a geometrical 
object are also among its formal parts, which is the impurist view.33 
   In response, Devereux has suggested that Aristotle complains not that his opponents omit 
reference to what is the matter of geometrical objects by his own lights, but merely to what 
they mistake for matter.34 Hence, Aristotle’s point is that the continuous is a non-material 
formal part of geometrical objects, just as the hard purist maintains. However, if Devereux is 
right, according to Aristotle, the continuous should not count as the matter of geometrical 
objects. But there is good evidence that Aristotle does take the continuous to be the matter of 
geometrical objects, namely, their intelligible matter. 
   In Z.10-11, Aristotle explicitly analyses geometrical objects as composites of a geometrical 
form and intelligible matter (1036a2-12; 1036b32-37a5). He contrasts intelligible matter with 
perceptible matter (1036a9-12; 1037a4-5), and he seems to think of intelligible matter as 
something like pure spatial extension which 'is present in perceptible things not qua 
                                               
32 At least for the sake of argument, then, Aristotle takes numbers to be forms of geometrical objects. He treats 
numbers as forms of geometrical objects elsewhere, too. See Meta. H.2, 1043b33-34, and DA III.4, 429b18-20. 
33 Whiting 1991: 626; Peramatzis 2011, ch. 4: 58-59. 
34 Devereux 2010: 180. 
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perceptible' (1036a11).35 Indeed, elsewhere, he identifies the matter of geometrical objects 
with the continuous.36 Moreover, the mention of 'lines' at 1036b9 is helpful. For in his 
summary of Z.10, Aristotle contrasted the perceptible with the mathematical right angle, 
treating the lines as the (intelligible) matter of the latter in analogy with the bronze of the 
bronze right angle (1036a20-22). 
   Hence, it seems that, for Aristotle himself, the continuous is the (intelligible) matter of 
geometrical objects. But then Devereux’s response fails. It is not just that Aristotle’s 
opponents mistake the continuous for matter. Rather, they omit reference to what, by 
Aristotle’s own lights, is matter, and they are wrong for doing so. According to Aristotle, 
geometrical objects should be defined with reference to their (intelligible) matter. But if all 
the parts of an object mentioned in its definition must be formal parts, as the hard purist has it, 
some of the formal parts of a geometrical object are also material parts, and hence geometrical 
forms must be impure. 
   Analogous problems arise for the hard purist interpretation of the SYP. The section at 
1036b21-24 refers not only back to the MP but also forward to the SYP. Aristotle generalizes 
his conclusion from the MP: One should not remove the matter from the definition of 
anything which is 'this in this or these being in this state' (1036b23-24), that is, 'this form in 
this matter' or 'these material parts in this (formal) state'. He then relies on that general 
principle to confront the Platonist Socrates the Younger:37 
 
The comparison, then, concerning the animal which Socrates the Younger used to 
draw, does not hold up (οὐ καλῶς ἔχει). For it leads away from the truth and makes 
one suppose that the human being can be without its parts, just as the circle without 
                                               
35 See Mueller 1970 for a classic discussion. 
36 In DA III.4, for instance, he says that the straight 'is like the snub', and, unlike the essence of the straight, the 
straight itself is 'with [the] continuous' (429b18-22). See also De caelo I.1, 268a8-9, and Meta. K.3, 1061a32-35. 
37 Plato introduces Socrates the Younger as a silent character in the Theaetetus and the Sophist, and as the main 
interlocutor in the Statesman. See Kapp 1923 for a discussion of Socrates the Younger. 
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the bronze. But the case is not similar; for the animal is something perceptible 
(αἰσθητόν), and it cannot be defined (ὁρίσασθαι) without motion, nor therefore without 
its parts being in a certain state. For the hand is not a part of the human being in just 
any state, but only the hand which is capable of fulfilling its function, inasmuch as it is 
ensouled; but if it is not ensouled, it is not a part. (1036b24-32) 
 
   Prima facie, Aristotle’s line of reasoning is as follows: Socrates the Younger is an extreme 
exponent of the view rejected in the MP. He wants to define not only geometrical objects but 
even sensible objects without reference to their matter. Hence, he treats human beings, and 
animals more generally, in analogy with the (mathematical) circle. Circles are intelligible 
composites (1036a3-4) and can be defined without reference to perceptible matter. Similarly, 
according to Socrates the Younger, animals can be defined without reference to perceptible 
matter. But, Aristotle objects, there is a disanalogy: Animals, unlike (mathematical) circles, 
are perceptible objects.38 Hence, the animal 'cannot be defined without motion, nor therefore 
without its parts being in a certain state' (1036b29-30).39 
   That reading, if correct, is disastrous for the hard purist. For the hard purist claims that 
sensible objects should be defined with reference to their formal parts alone. Hence, if they 
should be defined with reference to their perceptible matter too, some of their formal parts 
must be material as well, and impurism is true. In order to avoid that consequence, Frede and 
Patzig have attempted to show that, according to Aristotle, animals should not be defined with 
reference to their material parts. Rather, Aristotle criticizes Socrates the Younger because his 
position may mislead one into thinking that forms can exist without matter. According to the 
                                               
38 We should keep the reading ' αἰσθητόν' or 'perceptible', as transmitted by all manuscripts, pace Frede & Patzig 
who supply 'αἰσθητικόν' or 'capable of perception' (Frede & Patzig 1988 II: 210-211). For Aristotle’s point is 
precisely to contrast perceptible with intelligible objects: Intelligible objects, as he argued in the MP, should be 
defined with reference to their intelligible material parts, but not to any perceptible matter. 
39 For the definitional connection between (perceptible) matter and motion, see also Meta. E.1, 1026a2-3, to 
which we will return in section 5. 
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hard purist, then, animals should be defined with reference to the capacities of their souls 
alone, such as the capacity for perception. The material bodily parts of the animal are not 
explicitly mentioned in its definition, but their existence is implied since they are required for 
the animal to have the relevant capacities.40 
   However, the issue of 'taking away the matter' (1036b23) with which both the MP and the 
SYP are occupied, is a puzzle 'about definitions' (1036b21), an instance of which has been 
stated as a puzzle 'about the circle and the triangle that it is not appropriate for them to be 
defined by lines and the continuous (γραµµαῖς ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ τῷ συνεχεῖ)' (1036b9-10). But 
surely defining an object by the continuous has to involve explicit reference to the continuous, 
and similarly, one would think, for other instances of the puzzle. For instance, the puzzle 
whether the definition of an animal should refer to its perceptible matter must be concerned 
with an explicit definition of the animal no less than the puzzle whether the definition of a 
geometrical object should refer to its intelligible matter. Plausibly, then, Aristotle claims that 
the animal should be explicitly defined in terms of its material parts, contra Frede and Patzig. 
   Reformist hard purists admit that last point but draw on the fact that, in the SYP, Aristotle 
discusses the relation between the whole and its functional parts. In that respect, as we will 
see in detail below, the SYP importantly differs from the Puzzling Passage, where Aristotle 
was interested in the relation between a whole and the bits of matter into which it perishes. 
Some hard purists, then, hold that the functional parts mentioned in the SYP, such as the 
hand, are not 'material' parts at all, properly speaking, and can be parts of the form.41 Yet, 
Aristotle speaks of the functional parts of sensible composites as their matter, as we will see 
in more detail later.42 Moreover, if the hard purist admits that the functional parts of a 
composite are parts of the form, and merely insists that those are not 'material' in the right 
way, the distinction between hard purism and impurism is in danger of becoming merely 
                                               
40 Frede & Patzig 1988 II: 209-210; Frede 1990: 119-121. 
41 Wedin 2000, ch. 10: 338; Devereux 2010: 183-184; Chiaradonna 2014: 384-388. 
42 See e.g. Z.10, 1035b11-12; 1035b20-25. I will return to those passages in section 5.iv). 
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notational.43 Overall, therefore, while hard purism fared well as a reading of the introductory 
section of Z.11, it is difficult to sustain as an interpretation of the MP and the SYP. 
   Unlike the hard purist, the soft purist is not troubled by the MP and the SYP. For unlike the 
hard purist, the soft purist accepts that a composite can be defined with reference to its non-
formal material parts. Hence, the material parts with reference to which composites are said to 
be defined in the MP and the SYP need not be formal parts, and neither geometrical forms nor 
forms of sensible objects turn out to be impure. Of course, the details of the soft purist reading 
of those passages are not trivial. As we will see in our discussion of hierarchical purism, 
additional work is needed to show that there can be any sort of account of a composite which 
mentions its material parts. But in general terms, soft purists can take the MP and the SYP to 
support their view: Composites should be defined with reference to some of their material 
parts, and the point of that conclusion is precisely that those material parts are not formal 
parts of the composites.44 
   That said, we should not forget that the soft purist had trouble to account for the implication 
in the introductory section of Z.11 that the definition of a composite is a definition solely in 
terms of its form. That issue will arise more forcefully in the summary of Z.4-11 to which we 
are turning now. 
 
ii) The Summary of Z.4-11 (1037a21-b7) 
 
At first sight, the summary of Z.4-11, or better, that part of it which is concerned with Z.10-11 
(1037a21-33), supports hard purism against soft purism. However, underneath its surface, the 
summary will be seen to display the same structure as the Puzzling Passage in Z.10 and the 
main body of Z.11, and hence to be difficult for both hard and soft purists. 
                                               
43 Irwin’s brand of impurism as we will see, takes the SYP precisely the way suggested by our reformist hard 
purists, except for the claim that those parts are not 'material' (Irwin 1988: 245-247). 
44 Ross 1924 II: 203; Gill 1989, ch. 4: 133-136; Heinaman 1997. 
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   Hard purism rests largely on what I will call the 'substance claim' in the summary: 
 
But of [the composite substance] there is an account in a sense and there is not: For 
with its matter, there is not (for [matter] is indefinite (ἀόριστον)), but in accordance 
with primary substance there is, for instance, of human being, the account of the soul. 
(1037a26-29) 
 
Here, Aristotle says explicitly that the only definition of a composite is in accordance with its 
primary substance or form, which is just the hard purist thesis. As we will see below, a later 
remark in the summary will qualify that claim and cast doubt on whether the summary 
provides straightforward evidence for hard purism. But first, let us consider how soft purists 
try to make sense of the substance claim. 
   As far as I am aware, there have been three direct soft purist responses to the substance 
claim: First, Ross holds that only prime matter is excluded from the definition of the 
composite because only prime matter is indefinite.45 Second, Heinaman argues that only the 
definition of the form must not refer to the matter of the composite, while the definition of the 
composite can, or should, refer to its matter.46 Third, Michael Ferejohn has suggested that the 
identification of substance as 'the immanent form (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν)' (1037a29) implies that 
not only the form but also the matter of the composite should be mentioned in its definition.47 
   None of those responses are convincing. As for Ross, Aristotle treats matter quite generally 
as 'indefinite', not just prime matter (if Aristotle even has a notion of prime matter).48 Hence, 
there is no reason to think that Aristotle’s claim here is restricted to prime matter. Heinaman’s 
answer, in turn, does not succeed because the substance claim explicitly concerns the 
                                               
45 Ross 1924 II: 205. 
46 Heinaman 1997: 295. 
47 Ferejohn 1994: 315-316. 
48 See for example Meta. Θ.7, 1049a36-b2. 
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definition of the composite, not just of its form. Nor is Ferejohn’s suggestion any more 
successful. For even if forms are immanent in matter, it may be that the composite should be 
defined without reference to the matter in which the forms are immanent. Unsurprisingly, 
then, soft purism cannot accommodate the substance claim any more than other instances of 
the same claim found in part [A] of the Puzzling Passage or the introductory section of Z.11.49 
   That said, the summary as a whole does not support hard purism either. For Aristotle 
follows up on the substance claim as follows: 'But in the composite substance, such as snub 
nose or Kallias, the matter will be present too' (1037a32-33). Superficially, that claim does 
not have any definitional import, but it appears to refer us back to a passage which does. The 
only other place in Z.10-11 where Kallias is mentioned (in tandem with the snub) is in the 
aftermath of part [B] of the Puzzling Passage. There, both the snub (1035a26) and Kallias 
(1035a33) are cited as examples for 'things taken together with matter' which should be 
defined with reference to their material parts. Since Aristotle makes the effort to remind us of 
that earlier passage, presumably, the definitional claim made there is still in place.50 But if 
that is right, even though the substance claim is in line with hard purism, the summary as a 
whole is not. For hard purism cannot account for the implied definitional claim at 1037a32-33 
any more than for part [B] of the Puzzling Passage. 
   Hence, the summary, no less than the Puzzling Passage and the main body of Z.11, exhibits 
the very dialectic which has proven so troublesome: First, Aristotle claims that the composite 
should be defined with reference to its formal parts alone, but then he goes on to claim that 
some of its material parts should be mentioned too. Neither hard nor soft purism sits well with 
that dialectic. If impurism can do better, and if there are no further purist alternatives, we may 
have good reason to abandon purism. 
 
                                               
49 See also Z.10, 1035b31-36a2. 
50 Cf. Gill 1989, ch. 4: 136-137. 
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Impurists agree with hard purists that the definition of a composite is a definition solely in 
terms of its formal parts. But what presented itself as a difficulty for the hard purist, namely, 
that Aristotle also claims that the composite should be defined with reference to its matter, is 
welcomed by the impurist. Indeed, impurism promises a happy synthesis of hard and soft 
purism: Aristotle is expected to claim both that only the formal parts of a composite should be 
mentioned in its definition and that its matter should be mentioned. For some material parts, 
or at least some material features, of the composite are parts of its form. 
   Still, having spelled out the impurist reading of Z.10-11, I will argue that it fails no less than 
hard and soft purism. Instead, as we will see in the next section, we have to revert to a version 
of purism, namely, hierarchical purism. 
 
i) The Impurist Reading of Z.10-11 
 
Let us first return to the Puzzling Passage in Z.10. In part [A] of that passage, Aristotle 
claimed that composites should be defined without reference to the material parts into which 
they perish. For example, a human being should be defined without reference to its flesh and 
bones. But in part [B] of the same passage, Aristotle said that composites should be defined 
with reference to the material parts into which it perishes. For instance, Kallias should be 
defined with reference to his flesh and bones. The impurist may aim to resolve that apparent 
inconsistency by appeal to the material principles of the composite.51 
   Remember that some impurists distinguish between the particular bits of matter into which a 
composite perishes and the material features of the composite. Only the latter are parts of the 
                                               
51 As David Charles has suggested (in conversation). 
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form. That distinction promises an elegant solution to our puzzle: In [A], Aristotle argues that 
the particular bits of matter into which a composite perishes should not be mentioned in its 
definition. But in [B], Aristotle speaks of material parts as 'principles' (1035a24), and the 
impurist can take those to be material features of the composite rather than parts into which 
the composite perishes. Thus, Aristotle argues consistently that the material parts into which a 
composite perishes should not be mentioned in its definition, and are not parts of its form, but 
that the material principles or features of the composite should be mentioned in its definition 
and are parts of its form.52 
   The impurist takes the MP and the SYP in Z.11 to confirm the same sort of point. First, 
according to the impurist, Aristotle argues in the MP that the continuous is both a formal and 
a material part of the geometrical composite, and hence that geometrical forms are impure, as 
seen in our discussion of hard purism.53 More importantly, the SYP is taken to directly 
support impurism about the forms of sensible objects. According to Irwin and Whiting, 
Aristotle commits himself to the view that the animal should be defined with reference to its 
functional material parts.54 On Peramatzis’s version of impurism, the animal, or human being, 
should be defined with reference to its material features, such as 'having fully functional 
hands'.55 But on either view, forms of sensible objects turn out to be impure. For if the animal 
is defined with reference to its functional matter or material features, and it is defined 
exclusively with reference to its formal parts, the functional matter or material features must 
be formal parts of the composite. 
   Thus, apparently, impurism can draw on the MP and the SYP as support no less than soft 
purism. But unlike soft purism, impurism does not seem to have any trouble with passages 
                                               
52 Similarly, Peramatzis argues that, in the case of the syllable mentioned at1035a9-14, the letters of the syllable 
are neither material constituents of the token syllable nor of the type syllable, but rather material features or 
ways of being (2011, ch. 3: 46-47). 
53 Whiting 1991: 626; Peramatzis 2011, ch. 4: 58-59. 
54 Whiting 1986: 372; 1991: 631; Irwin 1988, ch. 11: 245-247. 
55 Peramatzis 2011, ch. 5: 98-99; Peramatzis 2015: 209-210. See also Charles 2008: 15-17 (discussing the 
implications of DA I.1). 
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like the summary of Z.4-11 where Aristotle claims that only the formal parts of a composite 
should be mentioned in its definition. For on impurism, it is true that the definition of a 
composite mentions only its formal parts, not the indefinite non-formal material parts of the 
composite.56 Nonetheless, ultimately impurism does not work as an interpretation of Z.10-11. 
 
ii) Why Impurism Fails  
 
A first problem with impurism arises from the MP. According to the impurist, Aristotle’s 
claim in the MP is that the lines and the continuous are both formal and material parts of the 
geometrical object, and hence that the geometrical form is posterior to some of the material 
parts of the composite, namely, to the lines and the continuous. But in the summary of Z.10, 
Aristotle claims that 'the right angle without matter is posterior to the parts in the account, yet 
prior to the parts in the particulars' (1036a22-23, my italics). In the case of the intelligible 
right angle, then, the right angle without matter, that is, the form of the right angle, is 
posterior to its own parts but prior to the intelligible material parts of the intelligible 
composite, namely, its lines (1036a21). Aristotle effectively restates the same point in Z.11 
when he claims that '[the intelligible semi-circles] will not be parts of the universal circle but 
of the particulars' (1037a2-3). It would be surprising if Aristotle argued for the negation of 
that claim in the MP, as the impurist has it. 
   But the main objection concerns the impurist reading of both the Puzzling Passage and the 
SYP. As for the Puzzling Passage, the impurist move was to distinguish between the material 
parts into which a composite perishes and its material principles. However, it is doubtful that 
such a distinction can be found in the passage. Aristotle says: 'Some things are from the parts 
into which they perish as from principles (ὡς ἀρχῶν), but others are not' (1035a24-25). It 
                                               
56 Peramatzis 2011, ch. 3: 51. 
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seems quite clear that the principles are not distinguished from the material parts into which 
composites perish but identified with them. That would also fit Aristotle’s treatment of the 
bits of matter from which a composite comes to be as its material principle in the Physics.57 
   If that is right, the impurist faces the same difficulty as the hard purist. Although the 
impurist thinks that either the functional matter or the material features of the composite 
should be mentioned in its definition, and hence are among the parts of its form, the impurist 
wants to exclude reference to the bits of matter into which the composite perishes from its 
definition. Just like the hard purist, therefore, the impurist has trouble accommodating [B], 
where Aristotle tells us that the composite is defined with reference to the material parts into 
which it perishes.  
   Peramatzis recognizes that problem and argues that [B] is concerned merely with the 
existential dependence of composites on the material parts into which they perish.58 However, 
in [B], Aristotle is explicitly concerned with 'accounts' of composites, not merely with an 
existential dependence relation. After all, he claims that 'the account of such parts will be in 
[the accounts] of some things' (1035a22-23). The Puzzling Passage, far from supporting 
impurism, is in fact a problem for the view. 
   A similar difficulty comes about for the impurist reading of the SYP. Recall what Aristotle 
says in the crucial section of the SYP: 
 
[T]he animal is something perceptible (αἰσθητόν), and it cannot be defined 
(ὁρίσασθαι) without motion, nor therefore without its parts being in a certain state. 
For the hand is not a part of the human being in just any state, but only the hand 
which is capable of fulfilling its function, inasmuch as it is ensouled; but if it is not 
ensouled, it is not a part.  (1036b28-32) 
                                               
57 See e.g. Phys. I.7, 190b17-91a3.  
58 Peramatzis 2011, ch. 3: 49. 
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   There are two impurist options here. Prima facie, Aristotle tells us that the animal should be 
defined with reference to 'its parts being in a certain state', such as the ensouled hand 'capable 
of fulfilling its function'. That is, prima facie, Aristotle’s claim is that the animal should be 
defined with reference to its concrete functional material parts, such as the (ensouled) hand, 
and it is those concrete functional material parts which are parts of the form. That is the first 
impurist option, defended by Irwin.59 
   The problem with the first impurist option is that, in Z.10, Aristotle explicitly denies that 
functional material parts are prior to the form or soul of an organism. Having identified the 
soul as the substance or form of the animal (1035b14-16), he says that 'the parts [of the soul], 
either some or all of them, are prior to the composite animal, and similarly in each case, but 
the body and its parts are posterior to that substance' (1035b18-21). Indeed, in the SYP itself, 
Aristotle seems to recall that doctrine. For 'if [the hand] is not ensouled, it is not a part [of the 
human being]' (1036b32), which suggests that the hand of a human being is posterior to its 
soul. Assuming that Aristotle maintains a coherent account of the relation between body and 
soul in Z.10-11, we should reject an interpretation of the SYP which makes it straightaway 
inconsistent with the doctrine stated in Z.10. 
   The second impurist option, advocated by Peramatzis, avoids the problem just mentioned. 
On that version, it is not the concrete functional material parts of a composite (nor types of 
such parts), which are parts of the form,60 but rather material features, such as 'having living 
and fully functional hands which can perform successfully their relevant function'.61 While 
the functional material parts of the composite may be posterior to the soul, the relevant 
                                               
59 Irwin 1988, ch. 11: 246. 
60 Peramatzis 2011, ch. 1: 10. 
61 Peramatzis 2011, ch. 5: 98. 
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material features are prior. The force of the SYP, then, is that the animal should be defined 
with reference not to its (functional) material parts but to its material features. 
   That impurist move is sophisticated, but perhaps too sophisticated for the SYP. For Aristotle 
is quite explicit that the animal cannot be defined 'without its parts being in a certain state' 
(1036b30). It is true that the state of the parts is important for the definition, and perhaps we 
can understand the state of the parts as a material feature of the organism such as 'having fully 
functional hands'. But it is equally true that the parts themselves are important for the 
definition: It is the parts in some state which should be mentioned.62 Hence, for the brand of 
impurism we are considering, the SYP (much like the Puzzling Passage) shows too much, 
namely, that the concrete material parts (or perhaps types thereof) should be mentioned in the 
definition of the composite, and so, by impurist lights, are parts of the form. Overall, then, 
neither of our two impurist interpretations of the SYP is persuasive. 
   Where does that leave us? On the one hand, neither hard purism nor soft purism promises a 
coherent reading of Z.10-11. On the other hand, impurism cannot handle crucial passages, 
such as the Puzzling Passage or the SYP, either. I will argue next that hierarchical purism 
offers a unified interpretation of Z.10-11 which avoids the problems encountered so far. If 
that is right, we should take Z.10-11 to argue for the purity of forms after all. 
 
 
5. Hierarchical Purism 
 
We have come upon a tension in Z.10-11: Aristotle claims both that matter-form composites 
should be defined with reference to their forms alone, and that they should be defined with 
reference to their matter, too. The suggestion of hierarchical purism is that we can relieve that 
                                               
62 Cf. Devereux 2010: 180. 
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tension if we recognize that, in Z.10-11, Aristotle takes heed not only of the concerns of first 
philosophy but also of those of second philosophy or physics. According to Aristotle, if one 
considers a composite only insofar as it has a form (as the first philosopher does), one should 
define it with reference to its form alone. But if one considers a composite insofar as it has 
both a form and matter (which is the physicist’s perspective), one should define it with 
reference to form and matter. In the case of intelligible composites, a similar distinction holds 
between the perspective of first philosophy and the perspective of geometry. 
   I will begin by motivating hierarchical purism as a response to the Puzzling Passage in Z.10, 
before extending the hierarchical purist reading to Z.11. I will then say more about first and 
second philosophy in Z.10-11, and I will discuss the implication that each composite has two 
definitions. In the next and final section, I will explain why, if hierarchical purism is true, 
forms turn out to be pure. 
 
i) Solving the Z.10 Puzzle 
 
Let us return to a passage early on in Z.10, which I will call the 'Hylomorphic Passage': 
 
If, then, one thing is matter, another form, and a further thing the composite (τὸ ἐκ 
τούτων), and if matter is substance and form and the composite, then there is a sense 
in which matter, too, is said to be a part of something, and there is a sense in which it 
is not, but those things from which the account of the form is (ἐξ ὧν ὀ τοῦ εἴδους 
λόγος). For instance, flesh is not a part of concavity (for that is the matter in which it 
comes to be), but a part of snubness; and the bronze is a part of the composite statue 
(τοῦ συνόλου ἀνδριάντος), but not of the statue said as form (τοῦ δ’ ὡς εἴδους 
λεγοµένου ἀνδριάντος οὔ) (for both the form and each thing insofar as it has a form 
should be called [by the name of the thing], but the material by itself should never be 
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called [by the name of the thing]). That is why the account of the circle does not 
contain the account of the segments, but the account of the syllable contains the 
account of the letters; for the letters are parts of the account of the form (τοῦ λόγου 
µέρη τοῦ εἴδους) and are not matter, but the segments are parts in this way as matter 
in which [the form] comes to be. (1035a1-12) 
 
   Large parts of the passage are dedicated to explicating the thesis that 'there is a sense in 
which matter, too, is said to be a part of something, and there is a sense in which it is not' 
(1035a2-3). Aristotle distinguishes between a composite whole (σύνολον) and an object 'said 
as form' (1035a7). Probably, Aristotle has in mind a linguistic distinction which he draws 
more clearly elsewhere. In Metaphysics H.3, for example, he says: 'We must not ignore that 
sometimes it is hidden whether the name signifies the composite substance or the actuality 
and the form' (1043a29-31).63 Names such as 'statue' can either refer to a composite object, or 
to the form of that object. Thus, if we use a name to refer to a composite, then matter is a part 
of the referent, but if we use the same name to refer to a form, matter is not a part of the 
referent. Bronze is a part of the composite statue, but not of the form of the statue.64 
   Aristotle goes on to state the principle more generally: 'Both the form and each thing insofar 
as it has a form (ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει) should be called ['something'], but the material by itself should 
never be called ['something']' (1035a7-9).65 By any name, we can refer either to the form of a 
composite or to the matter-form composite itself insofar as it has a form, but never to the 
                                               
63 See also Meta. Z.8, 1033b17-18. 
64 Cf. Ps.-Alexander 503.16-17; Bonitz 1848-49: 333; Frede & Patzig 1988 II: 174; Bostock 1994: 148. 
65 The Greek reads: 'λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δ’ ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ’ αὑτὸ λεκτέον'. 
The sentence can be translated in two different ways. One option is to take 'each thing' ('ἕκαστον') to be part of 
the subject of the sentence and to supply part of the predicate, as I did. Alternatively, one can take 'each thing' to 
be part of the predicate and supply part of the subject, as in 'the form and [the thing] insofar as it has a form 
should be said to be each thing'. Furth offers both sorts of translation (1985: 23; 119). I take 'each thing' to be 
part of the subject because I would expect 'insofar as it has a form' not to float free of any grammatical subject. 
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matter of the composite by itself. For instance, both the soul of Socrates and the composite of 
body and soul (insofar as it has a soul) can be called 'Socrates', but never the body by itself.66 
   Crucially, Aristotle’s principle leaves open another option. Even if we cannot use a name to 
refer to the matter of a composite by itself, we can use it to refer to the composite insofar as it 
has both a form and matter. Aristotle will take recourse to that option later, or so I will 
suggest. Equally importantly, however, only the composite insofar as it has a form is under 
consideration as of yet. The composite insofar as it has both a form and matter is disregarded 
for the time being. Hence, Aristotle can conclude ('that is why' (διό), 1035a9) that only the 
formal parts of a composite should be mentioned in its definition, for instance, the letters in 
the definition of the syllable (but not the segments in the definition of the circle). After all, it 
is a natural thought that, if one considers a composite only insofar as it has a form, it should 
be defined with reference to its formal parts alone. 
   One might object that, in speaking of the composite insofar as it has a form, Aristotle does 
not mean to introduce a special way of considering the composite but merely to highlight that 
the composite is a definite, nameable object in virtue of its form. In some sense, that point 
seems exactly right to me: In the Hylomorphic Passage, Aristotle does not draw a distinction 
between different ways of considering the composite. Rather, he simply assumes that 
composites are nameable, and definable, in virtue of their forms, without entertaining the 
possibility that the matter of the composite could play a role for explaining and defining what 
the composite is. As I see it, Aristotle’s confusing move will be precisely that he drops that 
background assumption later, at least in some contexts. 
   With the Hylomorphic Passage in mind, then, we can understand the Puzzling Passage. As 
noted above, there is a curious shift in terminology between parts [A] and [B] of the Puzzling 
Passage. In [A], Aristotle refers to the composite as a 'σύνολον' or 'whole', but in [B], he 
                                               
66 For the example, see Meta. Z.11, 1037a5-10. 
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begins to call it a 'συνειληµµένον' or 'thing taken together with matter'.67 Moreover, in [A], he 
argues that the composite (under the description of 'whole') should be defined without 
reference to the material parts into which it perishes because they are not parts of its form. But 
in [B], he claims that the composite (under the description of 'thing taken together with 
matter') should be defined with reference to the material parts into which it perishes. 
   The terminological difference extends beyond the Puzzling Passage. In the Hylomorphic 
Passage, Aristotle called the composite a 'σύνολον' or 'whole', speaking of the 'whole statue' 
('τοῦ συνόλου ἀνδριάντος') at 1035a6. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Puzzling 
Passage, he keeps speaking of the composite as a 'συνειληµµένον' or 'thing taken together 
with matter' (1035a25-b3). Moreover, as discussed, Aristotle claims in the Hylomorphic 
Passage that only the formal parts of the composite should be mentioned in its definition. By 
contrast, after the Puzzling Passage, Aristotle insists that, for example, 'the clay statue 
perishes into clay and the sphere into bronze and Kallias into flesh and bones' (1035a32-33), 
with the implication that those composites should be defined with reference to the material 
parts into which they perish. 
   My suggestion is that the shift in terminology marks a shift in how Aristotle thinks about 
the composite, and that the latter shift explains his divergent claims about the definition of the 
composite. As long as he refers to the composite neutrally as a 'whole', Aristotle is interested 
in the composite only insofar as it has a form, and hence, in [A], he adheres to the claim from 
the Hylomorphic Passage that only the formal parts should be mentioned in its definition. On 
the other hand, as soon as Aristotle begins to call the composite a 'thing taken together with 
matter' in [B], he draws on an option absent from the Hylomorphic Passage, namely that we 
might use a name to refer to the composite insofar as it has both a form and matter. For 
example, by 'Kallias', we might mean the composite insofar as it has both a soul and flesh and 
                                               
67 I am grateful to Jacob Rosen for helping me appreciate that distinction (in conversation). 
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bones. However, in that case, Kallias should be defined with reference to both his soul and the 
flesh and bones into which he perishes.68 
   Thus, the distinction between the 'σύνολον' or 'whole' in [A] and the 'συνειληµµένον' or 
'thing taken together with matter' in [B] is not an extensional one between composites of 
different classes (let alone between forms and composites, as soft purists have it), but rather 
an intensional one between different ways in which composites can be considered, either only 
insofar as they have a form, or insofar as they have both a form and matter. Moreover, 
depending on how a composite is considered, it should be defined in different ways. Hence, 
on hierarchical purism, the tension in the Puzzling Passage finally disappears. If a composite 
is considered one way, it should be defined with reference to its formal parts alone, as we are 
told in [A], but if the same composite is considered another way, it should be defined with 
reference to its material parts as well, as we are told in [B]. 
   None of that is to say that the terminological distinction between 'σύνολον' and 
'συνειληµµένον' always tracks the distinction between the composite only insofar as it has a 
form and the composite insofar as it has both a form and matter.69 Indeed, we will see shortly 
that, later in Z.11, 'σύνολον' can refer to the composite insofar as it has both a form and 
matter. Nonetheless, in the Puzzling Passage, the terminological distinction points at the 
distinction between different ways in which the composite can be considered. In other 





                                               
68 As the example of Socrates cited earlier shows, in Z.11, the body of a human being is treated as its matter, 
rather than, as here, the flesh and bones into which it perishes (1037a5-10). See section 5.iv) for more on that 
issue. 
69 I thank anonymous referee C for that clarification. 
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ii) Hierarchical Purism and Z.11 
 
I argued in section three that both the main body of Z.11 (1036a26-b32) and the relevant part 
of the summary of Z.4-11 (1037a21-33) have the same dialectic structure as the Puzzling 
Passage. I will now explain how the hierarchical purist can account for Z.11 in just the way in 
which she has handled the Puzzling Passage. 
   To begin with, the introductory section of Z.11 (1036a26-b7) is reminiscent of part [A] of 
the Puzzling Passage. For Aristotle recalls the example of the human being from [A], once 
again to argue that the flesh and bones of the human being are not parts 'of the form and the 
account' (1036b5, recalling 1035a21). A similar point applies to the 'substance claim' at 
1037a26-29 in the summary of Z.4-11 (that is, to the claim that the only definition of a 
composite is in accordance with primary substance). For the substance claim occurs in the 
context of what is effectively a paraphrase of the contention in [A] that the material parts of 
the composite are not parts of the substance of the composite (1037a24-26, paraphrasing 
1035a19-21). Plausibly, then, both the introductory section of Z.11 and the substance claim in 
the summary concern the composite only insofar as it has a form, no less than [A]. 
   In the Puzzling Passage, Aristotle’s shift of interest from the composite considered only 
insofar as it has a form to the composite considered insofar as it has both a form and matter 
was marked verbally: In [A], Aristotle spoke simply of the 'whole', while in [B] he began to 
speak of 'the thing taken together with matter'. At the outset of Z.11, Aristotle calls the 
composite the 'thing taken together with matter' (1036a27), which suggests that the composite 
insofar as it has both a form and matter might play a role in the chapter. But in the main body 
of Z.11, he does not explicitly refer to the composite at all. Nonetheless, there is a linguistic 
marker that, as Aristotle proceeds beyond the introductory section of Z.11 to the MP and the 
SYP, his interest shifts to the composite considered insofar as it has both a form and matter. 
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  At the beginning of the SYP, Aristotle says, pointing both back to the objects discussed in 
the MP and forward to the objects to be discussed in the SYP, that they are 'this in this or 
these in this state' (1036b23-24). The paradigm example for something which is 'this in this' is 
the snub, which is concavity in flesh (or in the nose).70 But right after the Puzzling Passage, 
the snub was also treated as an example for a 'thing taken together with the matter' 
(1035a26).71 Presumably, then, when Aristotle speaks of things which are 'this in this' he is 
concerned with the composite insofar as it has both a form and matter no less than when he 
speaks of 'the thing taken together with its matter'. If that is right, unlike the introductory 
section of Z.11, the MP and the SYP target the definition of the composite considered insofar 
as it has both a form and matter. 
   The summary of Z.4-11 calls for a similar remark. We saw that, a few lines beyond the 
substance claim, Aristotle says that 'in the composite substance (ἐν τῇ συνόλῳ οὐσίᾳ) the 
matter will be present too' (1037a32-33). Above I argued that Aristotle implicitly evokes the 
doctrine from Z.10 that composites should be defined with reference to their material parts. 
And even though Aristotle uses the word 'σύνολον' or 'whole' to evoke that earlier doctrine, 
the examples of the snub and Kallias, which were treated as 'things taken together with matter' 
in Z.10 (1035a26; 1035a33) suggest that here, unlike in the context of the substance claim, 
Aristotle has in mind the composite insofar as it has both a form and matter. 
   On those textual grounds, the hierarchical purist can extend her reading to Z.11. Both in the 
introductory section of Z.11 and in the context of the substance claim, Aristotle is interested 
in the composite only insofar as it has a form. Hence, he concludes (or assumes) that the 
composite should be defined with reference to its form alone. But in the MP and the SYP as 
well as in later parts of the summary of Z.4-11, Aristotle’s interest shifts to the composite 
                                               
70 See e.g. Meta. E.1, 1025b32-33; Z.5, 1030b16-20; Z.10, 1035a4-6; Phys. II.2, 194a4-7; DA III.4, 429b14. 
71 Similarly, at Meta. E.1, 1025b32. 
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insofar as it has both a form and matter. As in Z.10, he argues that, if we consider the 
composite in that way, it should be defined with reference to both its form and its matter. 
   One might doubt, though, whether hierarchical purism can account for Aristotle’s 
discussion of geometrical objects. I have argued that, in the MP, Aristotle objects to his 
opponents because they define geometrical objects with reference to their forms alone. Yet, 
on hierarchical purism, one might expect that Aristotle himself has to allow for such purely 
formal definitions of geometrical objects. For geometrical objects are intelligible composites, 
and the hierarchical purist holds that, in some contexts, composites should be defined with 
reference to their forms alone. But if that is right, why does Aristotle object to the purely 
formal definitions offered by his opponents? 
   In response, the hierarchical purist should urge the analogy between Aristotle’s treatment of 
intelligible and sensible composites. First of all, there is some evidence in Z.10-11 that, even 
for geometrical objects, Aristotle sometimes calls for purely formal definitions. In Z.10, he 
excludes mention of the segments of the circle from the definition of the circle on the grounds 
that they are its parts 'as matter in which [the circle] comes to be' (1035a12). Since he also 
says that the segments in question are 'closer to the form than the bronze when roundness 
comes to be in bronze' (1035a13-14), Aristotle seems to exclude mention of the intelligible 
material parts from the definition of the mathematical circle.72 Similarly, in Z.11, he excludes 
mention of the semi-circles from the definition of the circle on the grounds that they are its 
intelligible material parts (1036b32-37a5). Hence, Aristotle does not seem to object to purely 
formal definitions of geometrical objects tout court. 
   Nonetheless, in the MP, Aristotle does object to such purely formal definitions, or so I have 
argued. The hierarchical purist can offer a resolution of the apparent conflict in line with her 
interpretation of Aristotle’s treatment of sensible composites. The passage from Z.10 where 
                                               
72 On this topic, see also section 2 above. 
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Aristotle excludes mention of the segments from the definition of the circle occurs in the 
Hylomorphic Passage which leads into part [A] of the Puzzling Passage. In those passages, on 
the hierarchical purist interpretation, Aristotle discusses the composite only insofar as it has a 
form, and that is why he concludes for geometrical objects, no less than for sensible 
composites, that they ought to be defined with reference to their forms alone. Presumably, the 
same is true of the related passage in Z.11 (1036b32-37a5), although it is notoriously 
controversial what its exact place in the argument structure of Z.10-11 is.73  
  By contrast, in the MP, on the reading just offered, Aristotle is interested in geometrical 
objects insofar as they have both a form and (intelligible) matter. Hence, in the MP, but not in 
the other passages mentioned above, Aristotle concludes that one should mention intelligible 
matter in the definition of geometrical objects. His objection to the opponents is that they 
remove reference to intelligible matter no matter what. But in that case, removing mention of 
the matter is 'περίεργον', that is, 'needless trouble', or literally, 'overworking' (1036b23): It is 
not always the case that one should define composites, including both sensible and intelligible 
composites, with reference to their forms alone. As we will see shortly, in some contexts, it 
would be a mistake to omit reference to the matter of the composite. 
   That said, one can put a different spin on the objection, offering what we might call the no-
context objection. In the MP, Aristotle does not appear to qualify the claim that geometrical 
objects should not be purely formally defined. Instead, he seems to condemn his opponents 
outright for their definitional practice. In fact, the same problem seems to arise from 
Aristotle’s discussion of sensible composites. For instance, when Aristotle says that the 
animal should be defined with reference to its functional material parts in the SYP, his claim 
does not seem to be restricted to any particular context. In the summary of Z.4-11, too, 
Aristotle appears to claim unqualifiedly that the only definition of a composite is in 
                                               
73 For a discussion, see Ps.-Alexander 515.6-11; Ross 1924 II: 203; Frede & Patzig 1988 II: 214. Only Ross 
thinks that the passage originally belonged where it is now, while the other commentators treat it as a later 
insertion (according to Ps.-Alexander, Eudemus moved it from 1034b24-35a17). 
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accordance with primary substance. The objection to hierarchical purism, then, is that it 
restricts Aristotle’s claims to certain contexts, even though Aristotle himself does not 
explicitly restrict them in that way. 
   I will concede that Aristotle does not explicitly restrict his claims to any particular context. 
For instance, he does not come out and say that it is wrong only in some contexts to define 
geometrical objects purely formally. But I have argued above that there are markers which 
suggest implicit restrictions. On the hierarchical purist view, then, the explanation why 
Aristotle does not make the restrictions explicit is simply that, in the relevant passages, 
Aristotle is already operating within one or the other context. For example, in the SYP, 
Aristotle can put forward the claim that an animal should be defined with reference to its 
functional material parts without explicitly restricting that definitional practice to the context 
where one studies animals insofar as they have both a form and matter. For, in putting 
forward that claim, he is already operating in that context; and similarly for other passages. 
   If we grant the hierarchical purist all those moves, her burden becomes to elucidate what the 
different contexts are in which a composite should be considered and defined in one or the 
other way. Let us therefore turn to Aristotle’s definitional claims in more detail. 
 
iii) Two Definitions 
 
On hierarchical purism, each composite has two definitions, one in terms of its formal parts 
alone, and one in terms of both its formal and (some of) its material parts. That consequence 
of hierarchical purism becomes less surprising if we compare the view with Frede’s version of 
hard purism. On Frede’s view, composites are defined with reference to their forms alone in 
first philosophy, but in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, composites are defined with reference 
 Samuel Meister, Brown University
   
 36 
to both their form and their matter.74 Where the hierarchical purist differs from the hard purist 
is that he takes the definitional concerns of natural philosophy to feature in Zeta alongside the 
more austere definitional concerns of first philosophy. 
   There are some general considerations in favour of taking the definitional concerns of 
natural philosophy to be present in Zeta. The central question of Zeta, what primary substance 
is, is answered in terms of matter and form, apparently culminating in the conclusion that 
form is primary substance (Z.11, 1037a29). Indeed, Aristotle introduces the details of the 
matter-form distinction into Zeta by way of a précis of some results from the Physics in Z.7-
9.75 It is hardly shocking that he should import the definitional concerns of natural philosophy 
along with that technical machinery. Towards the end of Z.11, Aristotle even makes explicit 
that, in Z.10-11, the interests of physics have not been excluded, on the contrary, 'in a sense, 
the enquiry concerning perceptible substances is a function of physics and second philosophy' 
(1037a14-16). 
   But the main reason why we should acknowledge that, contra the hard purist, definitions in 
the style of natural philosophy have a place in Zeta is simply that, in Z.10-11, Aristotle 
prominently discusses how a composite should be defined if it is considered insofar as it has 
both a form and matter. For it is not the first philosopher but the physicist who is interested in 
the composite insofar as it has both a form and matter. In Metaphysics E.1, for example, we 
are told that 'physics is about separable but not unmovable things' (1026a13-14), and just like 
in the Socrates the Younger Passage (1036b29-30), Aristotle connects movability with 
(perceptible) matter to conclude concerning the definition given by the physicist: 'The account 
of none of [the natural things] is without motion, but it always has matter' (1026a2-3).76  
                                               
74 Frede 1990: 113-114. 
75 Frede & Patzig take Z.7-9 to be a later addition by Aristotle (1988 II: 104), but even if that is right, they were 
surely added with a purpose, namely, to introduce the machinery of matter and form which is absent from Z.4-6 
and which plays a crucial role in Z.10-11. 
76 Compare DA I.1, 403ab6-12 and Phys. II.2, 194a12-16. – Frede & Patzig claim that not the account but the 
object to be defined has matter (1988 II: 212). But a parallel with Meta. Z.7, where Aristotle says that 'the bronze 
circle has matter in its account' (1033a5) suggests that, in E.1, too, it is the account which has matter. 
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   Similarly, I submit, it is the definitional concerns of the physicist which are heeded when, in 
Z.10-11, Aristotle argues that the composite insofar as it has both a form and matter should be 
defined with reference to both its form and its matter. By contrast, when Aristotle argues that 
the composite insofar as it has only a form should be defined in purely formal terms, he is 
taking on the definitional concerns of first philosophy which abstracts away from the material 
features of matter-form composites. 
   However, the two definitions, the first-philosophical or metaphysical one and the second-
philosophical or physical one, are not on equal footing. Indeed, strictly, only the metaphysical 
definition is a definition at all. For a definition is an account which states the essence of an 
object,77 and the essence of a composite is its form.78 Hence, only the metaphysical definition 
states the essence of the composite, and only the metaphysical definition is a definition, 
strictly speaking. How does that outcome bear on the status of the physical definition? 
   In section one, I said that the accounts or λόγοι with which Z.10-11 is concerned are 
definitions. However, I also noted that Aristotle does not always use definitional language in 
the strictest sense, for example, in speaking of 'defining' organs and geometrical objects 
(1035b7-11; 1036b8-10), which, as non-substances, are, strictly speaking, not definable. 
There is some evidence that matter-form composites do not turn out to be strictly definable 
either if one thinks about them in the way the physicist does, namely, insofar as they have both 
a form and matter. 
   For in Metaphysics E.1, Aristotle says that 'all natural things are said like the snub' 
(1025b34-26a1), and proceeds to assign the study of such snublike things to the physicist 
(1026a24-26). But in Z.5, Aristotle claims that coupled entities like the snub can be defined 
only in a loose sense of 'definition' (1031a5-11). Hence, the definitions offered by the 
physicist of composites in terms of both their form and matter are not definitions in the 
                                               
77 Meta. Z.5, 1031a12. 
78 See Meta. Z.7, 1032b1-2; Z.10, 1035b14-16; Z.11, 1037a28-29. 
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strictest sense.79 On the other hand, since the essence of a composite is its form, the purely 
formal definitions provided by the first philosopher are definitions in the strictest sense. 
   The two definitions of the composite, then, are hierarchically ordered: Strictly, only the 
metaphysical definition is a definition of the composite, but loosely, one can also speak of a 
physical 'definition' which mentions not just the form or essence of the composite. Of course, 
the physicist is also interested in the essence or form of the composite: 'For the physicist 
needs to gain knowledge not only of matter but also of the substance in accordance with the 
account, and more so' (Z.11, 1037a16-17). Still, the definitional project of the physicist aims 
at a 'what-it-is' of the composite which is broader than its essence or form: 'It is clear how one 
needs to search for the what-it-is (τὸ τί ἐστι) and [how one needs to] define (ὁρίζεσθαι) 
[things]' (Metaphysics E.1, 1026a4-5), namely, always with respect to their matter since the 
physical definition 'always has matter' (1026a3), as discussed above. 
   The hierarchical order, then, of the two definitions of the composite arises from their 
content. The metaphysical, purely formal definition is a definition in the strict sense because it 
mentions only the essence of the composite. The physical definition is, strictly speaking, not a 
definition because it states not the essence or form of the composite but its broader τί ἐστι or 
'what-it-is'. For Aristotle, that 'what-it-is' of the composite, stated in a physical definition, is 
not exhausted by its essence or form but comprises some of the material features of the 
composite, too.80  
   Nonetheless, Aristotle speaks of the physical definition in definitional terms, not merely in 
the neutral terms of an 'account' (λόγος). In Metaphysics E.1, as just seen, he says that the 
physicist’s search for the 'what-it-is' of an object is an endeavor to 'define' (ὁρίζεσθαι) that 
object (1026a4-5). Similarly, when Aristotle argues in the SYP that objects which are 'this-in-
this' should be defined with reference to some of their material parts, he speaks of 'defining' 
                                               
79 Cf. Code 2010: 207-208. 
80 Cf. Gill who draws a distinction between the essence and what she calls the 'nature' (1989, ch. 4: 114-116) or 
'being' (2006: 356-359) of a composite. See also Code 2010: 205-206. 
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(ὁρίζεσθαι) the animal (1036b29), and he sets up his discussion as a response to a puzzle 
'about definitions' (1036b21). The crucial point, then, is not that physical definitions cannot be 
called 'definitions' but rather that those definitions are not definitions in the strict sense 
because they do not state the essence but rather the broader 'what-it-is' of the composite. 
   Analogous considerations apply to intelligible composites. Above, I argued that, on the 
view developed in Z.10-11, intelligible composites, too, can be considered either only insofar 
as they have a form, or insofar as they have both a form and matter. In the former case, 
intelligible composites should be defined purely formally, in the latter case, they should be 
defined with reference to their intelligible matter as well. This is not the place to enter the 
difficult details of the relation between first philosophy and mathematics.81 But the picture in 
Z.10-11 suggests that, unlike geometry, first philosophy abstracts away from the intelligible 
material features of geometrical objects, just as it abstracts away from the perceptible material 
features of sensible objects. It is only in first philosophy, then, that one should consider and 
define composites just insofar as they have forms. 
   
iv) Matter and Definition 
  
There is, however, the further question how there can be any definition of a composite which 
mentions both its form and its matter, even in a loose sense of 'definition'. In [B] of the 
Puzzling Passage, Aristotle discusses the definitions of particular composites in terms of the 
bits of matter into which they perish. Similarly, in the SYP, Aristotle seems to suggest that 
particular composites should be defined with reference to their concrete functional parts, such 
as the hand.82 But in Z.10, Aristotle also claims that there is no definition of particulars 
                                               
81 For a discussion of the relation between first philosophy, second philosophy, and mathematics, see e.g. 
Modrak 1989, and Lennox 2008. 
82 Soft purists typically take the SYP to be concerned with universal composites (Ross 1924 II: 203; Gill 1989, 
ch. 4: 135-136). But in the Puzzling Passage, Aristotle was clearly concerned with particulars, and the talk of an 
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(1036a2-9), and the reason he supplies is that 'matter by itself is not graspable (ἄγνωστος)' 
(1036a8-9).83 Aristotle’s point is not that there is no definition of particulars at all. Rather, he 
claims that particulars 'are always said and grasped by the universal account' (1036a8). One 
strategy is to consider the composite only insofar as it has a form, and hence to define in 
terms of its form (1035b34-16a1). But how can one define the composite, if one considers it 
insofar as it has both a form and matter? 
   I think that Aristotle recognizes that problem already in Z.10, and that it prompts him to 
introduce his notion of 'matter as universal' (Z.10, 1035b30).84 Aristotle contrasts the matter 
of universal composites, that is, species, with the concrete material parts of particulars, such 
as the flesh and bones of Socrates (1035b30-31).85 The relation between the matter of the 
particular composite and the matter of the universal composite can be understood as a relation 
of universalization: If one universalizes the particular bits of flesh and bones that make up 
Socrates one will end up with the flesh and bones 'as universal' of the human species.  
   Thus, although one cannot define a composite with reference to the particular bits of matter 
which make it up, one can define it with reference to its universalized matter, that is, the 
relevant kind of matter. For example, one can define Kallias insofar as he has both a soul and 
flesh and bones with reference to soul and the material kinds flesh and bones. The same 
solution can be applied to the concrete functional material parts mentioned in the SYP. It is 
the universalized functional parts which are mentioned in the definition of a composite. 
Moreover, even though Aristotle does not explicitly extend his account of universal 
composites to geometrical objects, a similar point might hold for intelligible matter.86 The 
spatial extension of a particular geometrical object cannot be mentioned in its definition, but 
                                               
'ensouled' hand (1036b32) in the SYP suggests that Aristotle has in mind a concrete hand which, when dead, is 
no longer a hand, rather than a universal type of hand. 
83 Cf. Z.15, 1039b27-30. 
84 Cf. Gill 1989, ch. 4: 135-136. 
85 See also Z.11, 1037a6-7. 
86 As anonymous referee A has suggested. 
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the universalized extension, say, its dimensionality, is apt for being mentioned in the 
definition. There are, then, two ways of providing a universal account of particulars, either by 
mentioning only their forms, or by mentioning both their forms and their universalized 
material parts. 
   With respect to sensible composites insofar as they have both a form and matter, there is the 
further question whether their definitions mention the (universalized) material parts into 
which they perish or whether the definitions mention their (universalized) functional parts. 
We saw that Aristotle seems to claim the former in the Puzzling Passage but the latter in the 
SYP. As far as I can tell, Aristotle does not settle that question in Z.10-11. Still, given that 
Aristotle’s prime example in Z.10-11 for matter into which animals perish, namely, flesh, 
turns out to be functional in the biological works,87 and that functional parts become more 
important over the course of Z.10-11, it seems that, ultimately, the (universalized) functional 
parts should be mentioned in the definition of the sensible composite. 
   Despite that last point, I think we should stop short of concluding with the reformist hard 
purists that, since ultimately only the functional parts of a sensible composite can be 
mentioned in its definition, none of its properly material parts will ever be mentioned. For 
Aristotle clearly speaks of the functional parts of a composite as its matter. For example, in 
arguing that the finger is posterior to the whole human being, he says that 'those things which 
are parts as matter and into which [the whole] is divided as into matter are posterior' 
(1035b11-12). Similarly, he urges later that the composite animal, unlike its soul, is divided 
into the bodily parts 'as into matter' (1035b21). The functional parts of a composite are 
material no less than the parts into which the composite perishes.  
 
 
                                               
87 See e.g. PA II.8, 653b19-25; GA II.1, 734b25-28. 
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I started out by characterizing our exegetical options in terms of the following two schematic 
claims which, in conjunction, suggest that, for Aristotle, forms are impure: 
 
 (1) The definition of a composite should mention only the form of the composite. 
 (2) The definition of a composite should mention the matter of the composite. 
 
As I presented them, hard purists accept (1) and reject (2), while soft purists accept (2) and 
reject (1). We can now see why the hierarchical purist should reject both (1) and (2) as they 
stand but can accept qualified versions of both: The definition of a composite considered only 
insofar as it has a form should mention only the form of the composite. But the definition of 
the same composite considered insofar as it has both a form and matter should mention the 
(universalized) material parts of the composite as well. 
   How does that bear on the debate over the purity of forms? On hierarchical purism, all 
passages in Z.10-11 which the impurist took as evidence for the view that the matter of a 
composite is part of its form (where 'matter' was spelled out variously as '(functional) material 
parts' or 'material features'), are concerned with the composite insofar as it has both a form 
and matter. But if a composite is considered insofar as it has both a form and matter, it should 
be defined with reference to its non-formal material parts, and hence nothing follows from 
those passages for the purity of forms. By contrast, when Aristotle is interested in the 
composite only insofar as it has a form, he consistently maintains that the composite should 
be defined without reference to its matter. But if forms were impure, even if one considered 
the composite only insofar as it has a form, one would have to define it with reference to its 
matter, contrary to hierarchical purism. Thus, insofar as Metaphysics Z.10-11 supports 
hierarchical purism, the text also supports the view that, for Aristotle, forms are pure. 
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   One advantage of that result is that there is no sign that the priority of form over matter 
might be undermined. For if forms are pure, no form is defined with reference to the matter of 
the composite to which it belongs, nor is the matter part of the essence of the form. It should 
be noted, however, just how abstract the discussion in Metaphysics Z.10-11 is. Even though 
examples of form and matter are mentioned, those examples seem to be toy cases which await 
a thorough treatment elsewhere. But that division of labour raises the question whether the 
abstract framework developed in Metaphysics Z.10-11 will withstand the application to 
specific cases. In particular, one may wonder whether the definition of soul as, on one 
formulation, 'the first actuality of the natural body that has life potentially' (DA II.1, 412a27-
28) does not imply the impurity of soul after all.  
   On the other hand, I think it would be a mistake to count the abstract nature of the 
discussion in Metaphysics Z.10-11 as a defect and to rely on the specifics of Aristotle’s 
natural philosophy to correct the general conclusions reached in the Metaphysics. On the 
contrary, I am inclined to proceed the other way around: If Aristotle’s metaphysical 
framework implies that forms are pure, our expectation should be that we can use that result 
to steer us towards a correct interpretation of applications of that framework. Hence, if 
hierarchical purism is the correct interpretation of Metaphysics Z.10-11, perhaps that 
interpretation can also help us understand less abstract Aristotelian texts, including De anima. 
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